The forecast for 2008 for Russia.

The forecast for 2008 for Russia.

As Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin, « wrote... The less woman we like, the we more easy like it ». In the appendix to economic (and other) to forecasts, it is words classics can be interpreted so: the more strongly the author is excited with object of forecasting, the less exact it turns out. Accordingly, to analyze the own forecast for Russia annual prescription it is much less pleasant, than similar - for economic.
Actually, the analysis of a modern Russian situation given in the forecast for Russia for 2007, an estimation of a condition and interaction of elite groups, is adequate enough, to change in it something I do not think necessary. Can be, it would be possible to add it some facts from clause published already in second half of year. Besides today it is possible to note some basic circumstances which have resulted in the course of the events considerably distinguished from described in forecast, but about it hardly is lower.
To not go into detail, we shall note three basic mistakes of the text of annual prescription. The first - it assumed, that "силовики" will manage to show some uniform ideology on the basis of which they could prove the corporate claims for authority in the country. Once again I shall repeat, corporate because each of them separately can quite count itself a part of the general elite and expects that as the concrete person it in it will be kept at any development of events. But it has not taken place.
As well as it was supposed in the forecast, absence of an intracorporate consensus has resulted in sharp conflicts which quintessence became two events: arrest of general Bulbova with V.Cherkesova's subsequent letter in "Businessman" and interview certain Шварцмана in same "Businessman". Such level of confrontation has shown what "sharply" to leave from authority to Putin in any way it is impossible - as it can result if not in civil war, to the most powerful intraelite collision which a stone on a stone to not leave from all so-called « путинской stability ».
Let's note, that though the mentioned events have taken place in the autumn, the conflict about what the Putin precisely knows, began much earlier. Actually, war of power clans went always, it is norm in any state, but before threat of loss of authority she could for a while and calm down, that I and assumed in the forecast. Also was mistaken.
In result in the forecast неминуемо should appear and the second mistake: at such development of events, about any purpose of the successor by prime-minister and speeches could not be. Formalization enough a strong figure on a position at which it has real levers of authority, would do Putin real by " a lame duck » in the American terminology. Differently, it could not carry out already the functions of the arbitrator effectively enough because one or several of the contradictory parties could address to a new figure - the future president, the successor. That there and then would create a sharp opposition of those who puts on the "old" president against those who puts on "new".
Let's note, that on a background and without that complex attitudes between the president and chairman of the government within the framework of working system of the device of the government at which all real economic powers are in the government, it for very short term would result in a catastrophic aggravation of contradictions inside already almost two presidential terms of uniform Russian elite. And if still to take into account, that the system of the device of the government does his opaque to the president and his administration the degree of this confrontation неминуемо would pass and to public sphere.
Let's note, that attempts to create structure which could supervise the government on behalf of the president, were repeatedly, once she even has crowned success (in 1997 - the beginning of 98). But then, in the spring 98 years joint efforts before a default "have demolished" so "harmful" structure and did not try to restore any more her as the objective information represented danger to all participants of political process. As to heads of administration the private problems they tried to solve due to purpose in the government on key posts for them the personal representatives.
Such variant, however, could not solve a system problem of adequate interaction of the president (as head of the state, instead of the concrete person) and the governments therefore antipresidential alliances of the government and the State Duma were constantly created. It differed both government Primakova, and Kasyanov government, and government Fradkova (the last, the truth, was politically more passive). Oleg Grigorjev (the chief of a department of the state actives of Economic management in 1997-98) has very in detail explained on our site this situation hardware and bureaucratic inevitability - as the Constitution 93 years has not finished idea of centralization - has not subordinated the government directly to the president as it is made in the USA.
So after it became clear, that new ideology (on the basis of which only and it was possible construction of an intracorporate consensus силовиков) it is not created, the preschedule announcement of the successor - the third mistake of the forecast became impossible also. At the same time, to keep the government before presidential elections too it was impossible - strong prime-minister (and any person borrowing this post long enough time, becomes a strong political figure, without dependence from the personal qualities - it is enough to recollect Kasyanov), in view of the mentioned absence of the presidential control over the government does political расклады poorly controllable.
In result, that has turned out also the forecast for Russia for 2007 which is starting with the maximal expediency has turned out, appeared unsuccessful. There has come time to proceed to the forecast for the come 2008.
We shall begin it with description of political circumstances which in the begun year become the problems, mentioned in the first part of our forecast. First of them is that elite consensus which has allowed to appear « путинской stability ». It will consist that to the end of 90th years the new Russian elite has come to a conclusion that, irrespective of an acuteness inside the elite conflict, is impossible to address for amplification of the positions to a society. We shall note, that the interdiction on a conclusion of internal conflicts for limits of elite is имманентной a part for any "democracy" in frameworks of the "Western" global project. As it can catastrophically destabilize a political situation and places under a threat not only lost in political fights, but also won.
In our country with this consensus all have agreed not - but these last, somehow gradually, appeared outside of limits of political life of Russia, and outside its territory too. And inside the country during Putin's presidency this informal elite contract was amplified with a plenty of the decisions facilitating his performance, especially, in the elective legislation.
Serious support to achievement and support of this arrangement about discharge of a society from participation in current political (and economic) life was given with the second circumstance. The rise in prices has allowed to increase by oil, gas and other natural resources essentially volume of "pie" which was redistributed within the framework of elite, and it gave a resource for the arrangement practically with all "offended" within the framework of elite conflicts which occur in all societies and at all times. Actually, during Putin any person observing informal arrangements, has not been deduced for limits of elite group.
But today the situation has changed in the radical image. First of all, "pie" has ceased to grow. As for the reasons internal - spent by group the liberal - рефоматоров the credit policy demands more and more and more resources even for preservation of a standard of life of the population, let alone his some increase. And external - dollar inflation обесценивает already saved up gold and exchange currency reserves also reduces effect from increase of the prices for resources. Besides though the public debt of the Russian Federation also was reduced seriously enough for last years, but the duty corporate, which return also has sharply grown demands redistribution of the current incomes.
Change of the president should result in serious enough changes in the top echelon of machinery of state. Even if to assume, that there will be no practically any changes (conditionally speaking, Медведев - on Putin, Putin's place - on place Зубкова, and Зубкова - on place Медведева in board of directors " Gazprom ") contradictions between administration of the president and the government which almost for certain will result in new hardware war in style of 90th years all the same will sharply become aggravated. And here it is practically inevitable a pleasant problem of distribution of superfluous "pie" it will be replaced with redistribution already available, that is it is necessary to select at someone something for ever...
These problems become aggravated due to one more circumstance. Exist, roughly speaking, two basic systems of definition of scale of access of the concrete person to public "pie": "administrative" and "elite". The first, more typical for east countries, will be, that the scale and quality of this access is defined by a post in machinery of state managements ("Tables of ranks") and sharply reduced in case of loss of this post. The second will be, that access to "pie" is defined by the informal intraelite status of the person and poorly correlates with his formal purposes in system of public service which can not be at all. We shall note, that such variant can exist only in the countries, with strongly advanced elite infrastructure: system of the "closed" clubs and the organizations within the framework of which the status of this or that person is defined.
The first way though there were also elements of the second was always habitual for Russia. But 8 years « путинской stability » have accustomed all to that anyone, even the smallest post is inextricably related with financial streams. And naturally enough, that those who will be compelled in the begun year to leave from official posts, will try "to withdraw" together with itself and these streams - for example, by the conclusion of long-term "enslaving" contracts with friendly structures. So new heads, having come on like a "warm" place, with interest will find out, that they are bound hand and foot by already authorized rules and arrangements, cannot result with itself the habitual employees as all places are already borrowed, and financial streams go "past" - to old heads who thus appeal to the "elite" positions and lean on the people which have stayed on key places.
In result, the conflict of two these systems will sharply become aggravated, and new heads who they were, the situation will stimulate to search and opening of numerous infringements and crimes of predecessors (somebody doubts, what them much enough, it is especial in view of quality of modern machinery of state?). Thus, in connection with a worsening economic situation (even prior to the beginning of a sharp, catastrophic stage of world crisis) and general-political confrontation, the administrative vertical will actively press on new (and old) heads, categorically demanding increase of an overall performance. About it, however, below, in an economic part of the forecast.
Will appeal to the government in such situation senselessly, especially if Putin all the same becomes prime-minister (in what personally I do not believe) as it will actively try to lower an acuteness of the elite conflicts incorporated still during the Путина-president. And questions will be solved at only economic level not only because they enter into powers of the government, but also that their conclusion in political sphere will mean inevitable connection of new and unfriendly force - administrations of the president.
In turn, offended which are always, неминуемо will start to deduce conflicts in political sphere, connecting unique instance in Russia, having political amateur performance. Differently, the new president will be filled up with a shaft of the information received both on official, and on informal channels about necessity of acceptance of political decisions in connection with numerous infringements and crimes.
Let's note, that itself Медведев which almost for certain becomes the president, by formation and an image of idea - the lawyer, законник, and it means, that if the mentioned information will be correctly structured (that, eventually, inevitably will take place) Медведев will start to make on it political decisions. Conditionally speaking, « for return to a legal field ». And if to this to add, that, as against the previous heads of Russia, it within the framework of the career, moved only « on growing », most likely, it will operate sharply enough
Let's note, that completeness of economic authority all the same remain at the government which will rather quickly agree within the framework of operative activity with the State Duma. And unique advantage which will be at the new president - an opportunity of acceptance of political decisions. It is possible, that at the first stage it will be, within the framework of the mentioned above elite consensus, to be kept in general from any actions. But all the increasing shaft of the critical information (more and more структурирующийся in a correct direction, namely, that all problems arise not from unsuccessful system, and from rough infringements of the law by separate "wreckers"), will push it on decision-making. And political as it basically cannot independently accept others.
And those persons, who will be interested in as much as possible to speed up this moment, those who is interested in acceleration of process of change of procedure of access to public "pie", will actively stimulate this process. But as it will be necessary for them to force to make of the new president political decisions they will appeal to the public, people, breaking thus base of the elite contract made on results of 90th years. And to explain them danger of such decision it is senseless - as, we shall repeat once again, the only thing for them a way to become successful, that is is high-grade enter (or to not leave) in modern Russian elite, is compulsion of the new president to carry out exclusive for the Russian state system political powers. And to make it it is possible only by deducing the conflict from banal dispute on financial streams on a political level.
Differently, put here not actually in Медведеве and at all in Медведеве. Any change of the first person within the framework of the political system created by Yeltsin, неминуемо defreezes the conflicts inhibited at the previous mode. There are two outputs from this situation. The first - returning to east system - when cannot be "oligarches", that is persons whom managements can influence a policy because of limits of system state. Differently, it is refusal of a capitalism, authority of the capital. The capitalism has destroyed absolute monarchy in Russia, but win tradition could not - the system working in the USSR, was essentially administrative, outside of a post, the device, any person essentially influences a policy not could in any way.
The second - creation of system of "elite" type, that is development of intraelite structure of decision-making and карьерного growth. And preconditions for it are - we have advanced enough system of regional, national and корпоративно-professional groups and communities inside which the hierarchy can not coincide at all with formal - bureaucratic. It are necessary to create only the mechanism of their interaction and to coordinate it to formal machineries of government. Put only that just this last step contradicts the Constitution accepted in 93 year which does by the Supreme arbitrator the president, practically not limiting it in this role. And constantly creating ground for the sharp conflict of elite to the president, constantly compelling the last to create and develop intraelite conflicts. Putin has tried to avoid this policy - and as a result has received a catastrophic situation in economy. Let's note, that in case of the variant offered by O.Grigorjevym, a situation differs strikingly: in this case the opportunities of the president brought in the Constitution, will be limited to his responsibility for the current economic activities.
In end of this analysis it is necessary to note, that it would be possible to try to create system of intraelite arrangements on the basis of similar system of one of large corporations (in public, instead of commercial sense). First of all, here the corporation power again occurs, informal association of workers of special services, what under this word to not understand. But last during Putin's presidency has shown such full feebleness regarding development of long-term political plans (the mentioned ideology only one fragment of this sad picture), that itself has compelled it to make a choice of the successor for the benefit of Медведева. Conditionally speaking, силовики for postSoviet time and could not create in the environment of analogue of the Political bureau of a Central Committee of the CPSU, as body of acceptance of political decisions.
Let's note, that all resulted reasonings practically do not mention an economic situation. More precisely, appeal only to its one party - a stop of growth of public "pie". And in fact the condition of economy in Russia in itself can put before the new president (and prime-minister!) serious problems.
Let's remind, that within the framework of the mentioned above elite consensus, the important functions of the control over a credit policy of the state have got to group of "liberals - reformers". They have taken advantage of it the same as at 96-98 гг, practically completely having repeated the policy of that period. And she even was carried out with same people - Ignatyev and Kudrin in 1997-98 were the first deputy ministers of the finance. In detail about it it is written in the forecast for 2007, we are interested now with results of this work.
As the main element of a "монетарно-liberal" policy in 90th years was sharp reduction of monetary weight (ostensibly, for struggle against inflation) similar methods were applied also last years (especially after leaving Геращенко from a post of chairman of the Central Bank). In result a level монетизации economy, a little having risen in 1999-2003 to grow has ceased. Certainly, and then, and now, crisis of credit liquidity caused growth of inflation. In 90th years this crisis was more rigid (total amount of the credit made less than 10 % from gross national product at norm - about 100 %), than now (total volume of the credit in Russia - about 40 % from gross national product), therefore and inflation was higher.
And if in 90th years shortage of credit resources basically covered due to private issue of monetary substitutes (bills) last years their lack was compensated by two basic ways: translation of a part of calculations for limits of Russia and credits of foreign banks.
Last circumstance, together with the big proficiency of the foreign trade balance, allows liberals to support is artificial the overestimated rouble exchange rate, that, in turn, creates the whole bouquet of negative consequences for economy of Russia. First, constant (even let and not so fast) growth of a rouble exchange rate constantly reduces competitiveness of the Russian manufacturers, both on external, and in a home market. Import Russia continuously grows, manufacture if does not fall, all develops more slowly, and profitableness of manufacture falls. Second, all becomes more favourable and more favourable speculative operations in Russia which involve all available assets (as in a threshold of a default market GKO as the vacuum cleaner exhausted all available assets in the country). Thirdly, as well as in 90th years dependence of all domestic financial system on course risks grows - the currency debts saved up at a high rouble exchange rate hardly can be returned, if the rouble exchange rate will sharply fall.
Let's note, that half of those credits which are given in our country, have the "western" origin. And, certainly, they are limited in use - such credits do not go on support of manufacture, and are intended for reception of the speculative profit, first of all in the market of the real estate and the market of consumer crediting. Today these markets obviously are in a complex condition, just that the level of the income of the population does not allow their further "promotion".
Besides dependence of the Russian banks from "western" is greatest, as they, due to working demand lines of credit, in many respects close their problems with liquidity. Autumn bank crisis in the USA and Europe has caused acute problems with liquidity in the Russian banks which the liberal management of the Central Bank began to extinguish вбросом money. Thus, not having neither the fulfilled system of work with liquidity, nor experience, the staff. If still to take into account psychology of the Russian banker which any "superfluous" money there and then deduces for limits of the country efficiency of this work was enough low, and increase in monetary inflation - appreciable.
Let's note, as the saved up reserves here cannot serve as a guarantee - growth rate saved up corporate credits already exceeds growth rate of reserves, at comparable absolute values. We shall note still strange opinion, there is enough frequently проскальзывающее in expert and administrative circles - that the Stabilization fund is addition to ЗВР the Central Bank, while actually, it a part of these reserves.
There are also other problems - the inadequate tax system encouraging financial gamble and limiting real manufacture, fast growth of "shadow" economy, утеря the control of the Central Bank over monetary circulation and so on, but they were repeatedly discussed on a site and in this text are represented excessive
Such detailed enough discussion of economic problems has been given not casually - 2008 becomes year of "opening" of many of them. Well, really, during elections and the first months of the new president in any way it is not necessary to reduce a standard of living of an overwhelming part of the population sharply. But also to stop inflationary processes, reduction of incomes of hired workers in connection with stagnation of a making part of economy and enormous growth administrative having overcome, both on businessmen, and on citizens (as ростов charges on housing and communal services, for example) without radical change of a policy it is impossible. And for this purpose it is necessary to change not less considerably a managing top - that was unconditional табу last years. In result a fire try to fill with gasoline, and at once on two directions: raise social charges of the budget and pump up money the large state concerns created last years.
But growth of social charges cannot already result in positive effects - the economy has practically passed on inflationary rails, the rise in prices outstrips budgetary payments. As to state concerns and initially their efficiency was in doubt, and at presence of completely enormous budgets given « it is simple so » - without the rigid, fixed plans of works which default for executors is fraught with the most serious consequences - becomes simply zero, if not negative. The matter is that in the USSR the main figure in such concerns the main designer - as a matter of fact, instead of on a post was. And at us - the main manager of money who, by developed tradition, occurs any more from designers, and from "менагеров", the new, rather specific caste generated for last years.
On a theme of this group there are already many jokes (for example, translation of term "МВА" into Russian - the graduate of technical school of the Soviet trade), but its essence from it does not vary: these are people which purposefully trained on increase of efficiency of feedback of money! And at all on achievement of the concrete result necessary for the state! "Менагер" will never "bury" money to НИОКРы or a professional training - it will enclose them in the financial market, and for experts will search on a labour market... The Trouble only that there are no at us already today these experts... "Менагеров", but it is, a lot of, and they have already captivated even the state structures, as a matter of fact, essentially opposite to them on outlook.
Passing to an economic part of the forecast it is possible to note, that arrival of the new president неминуемо will cause some "audit" of a condition of the Russian economy and a control system of her. Also it will quickly be found out, that many of already widely advertised plans cannot be executed: because money have already plundered, because there is no staff because it is already impossible to repeat even the Soviet development and so on. That inflation is much higher than official figures, that those who is responsible for system of monetary circulation basically do not understand, how she is arranged, and can repeat senselessly only in different variants of a mantra from textbooks "экономикс", that how to return a corporate duty not clear and to use for this purpose gold and exchange currency reserves of the Central Bank it is impossible, as for this purpose is necessary общеэлитный a consensus, and so on, and so forth.
Not so also it is clear how to struggle with crisis of bank liquidity as it would be necessary to create new systems of interaction of banks from the Central Bank, but for this purpose it is necessary to change a management of this organization, and not simply to change, and under the new concept which, naturally, still nobody has written. And even if has written, authors precisely do not enter into modern Russian elite so to appoint them to high posts in frameworks of " an elite consensus » it is impossible. Not so clearly, what to do with crisis in the market of the real estate which is for the present supported in the "stiffened" condition, but by experience the USA we know, than all this can end. Especially in connection with that his main thing бенефициарам in the begun year all the same is necessary to retire.
Let's note, that all these problems take place irrespective of described in общеэкономическом the forecast of crisis in the world financial markets. After a deflationary shock a problem will be aggravated repeatedly as "pie", will be reduced « in times » but the matter is that the described problems can be shown prior to the beginning of a sharp stage of world crisis. To do the forecast how events will develop further, I am not taken at all as any of the listed problems can practically "shoot", and resulted in the first part of the forecast the analysis shows, that sharp elite crisis неминуемо will be imposed on crisis economic. Victims of economic perturbations (including personally very rich people) will desperately struggle for return of the privileges, banks, financial streams, toughening political strike. And those who will lose fights political, will be, for simplification of the situation and complication of a position of political opponents, to provoke economic problems: branch, regional, corporate.
Thus, year will be very complex, and I think, that as it already once was, the forecast in the beginning of summer should be added or specified essentially.